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Handbook
extensions/services/app-storage/SECURITY.mdView source ↗

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Security

Report vulnerabilities privately to the repository maintainer before publishing customer data, credentials or exploitation details. Never include real access keys, database URLs, sessions or order data in issues or fixtures.

The library is for trusted hosts. A storage Scope is not authorization. Callers must retain current actor/package/reference checks and a restricted scoped connection. Schema installation and signed row security remain host duties.

Uncertain external effects must be reconciled before retry. Expired jobs are not automatically reclaimed. Security fixes are maintained on main and identified in component releases.

Independent read host

data-service/ accepts private installed list actions only, through fresh current OAuth merchant authority. A separate nonowner read-only PostgreSQL login, signed role-bound context and forced RLS are mandatory. The serving process neither runs schema installation nor exposes a seed/write endpoint. The operator's migration and installation authority remains separate. See its README for the explicit schema/key setup and the still-required native object resolver.

The opt-in managed-write profile is a separate schema/permission upgrade. It requires current apps.manage and installed save rights, explicit confirmation, package digest and record revision. It shares the original mutation/state/history and atomic outbox sequence. Unsupported native policies deny. See the managed-write guide for exact positive/forbidden database privileges and uncertain-response handling.

Optional settings profile

Schema 3 is an explicit migration-owner upgrade of schema 2, never a startup migration. A separate fixed secrets table admits only settings, with forced signed tenant RLS and bounded authenticated ciphertext. No per-App SQL objects. The service needs APP_DATA_MODE=write, APP_DATA_SETTINGS=enabled and its own private key. Both scopes and nondelegatable personal_session: true, live: true claims must come from fresh fixed-endpoint introspection. Requests cannot supply these claims. Every settings read/write requires apps.read, apps.manage and team.manage. No secret export/resolution endpoint exists.

The trusted installation owner registers each package's canonical digest. Settings updates require explicit approval/current package and revision; removed settings and previous package secrets never inherit across upgrades. Partial updates preserve omitted current secrets. Wrong key/binding, late event failure or CAS conflict rolls back without emitting values. Vault keys are not scope signing keys. Their safe storage, backup and coordinated rotation belong to the operator; schema migration does not rotate encryption keys.

Explicit portable installation profile

Schema 4 adds narrow package/model DML, immutable version inserts and protected per-App budget accounting. No owner, DDL, signing-key, version-update/delete or quota-counter update authority is granted. Exact profile startup checks remain mandatory. SQL policies keep reserved package definitions outside installer writes. The operator supplies the scope catalogue; packages never grant their own scopes. The complete compiler and portable profile deny native references, publisher trust, UI, external effects and explicit data migrations until their real policies exist. Review is read-only; install requires a fresh personal live administrator, exact permissions/digest and current package revision. Models, package/version, budget initialization and minimized event commit together. No preview/publication flag can be supplied to skip immutable version admission.

The explicit job-supervision profile adds one fixed forced-RLS table. Its login cannot enqueue, change input/result/message/keys or create SQL objects. Current OAuth supplies identity; personal live administrative authority, explicit digest/ revision approval and reviewed uncertain outcomes gate control. Original leases, CAS and atomic events remain shared. Historical results require current package and all action rights; worker tokens and inputs never enter responses.