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Encrypted app configuration acceptance, 6 November 2026

Shared storage and required host crypto

Apps 0.18.0 exact source 3b366d0bf617a0dafd81b1eb4202b85d28cb2fad supplies existing app_service_secrets metadata, internal resolution and rotation. Core imports that exact source through components.lock.json. Model 0.12.0/runtime 0.2.0 unchanged.

Required Crypto seal/open methods retain the actual native platform key owner. The shared implementation preserves the original app:tenant:app:kind:digest:revision binding, scoped advisory/row locks, revision CAS, active package row check, ciphertext write and atomic metadata-only event. Caller transactions own commit/rollback. resolve_locked retains the shared secret row through original webhook verification and receipt persistence. No per-app tables/indexes, production schema migration, alternate key owner, default crypto or plaintext fallback are introduced.

Native settings reads retain the direct verified personal-administrator predicate; settings writes additionally require a live shop. Transport credential routes retain their original current team/user, live-shop, declared-kind and approved-digest checks. Input limits, configured-key projection and browser secret redaction remain native. Missing configuration remains distinct from a stale or undecryptable value, so operator fallback cannot silently replace rejected tenant credentials. Revision increment uses checked arithmetic and rejects exhausted/negative inputs explicitly.

Independent execution

Executable encrypted settings example:

APP_STORAGE_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://.../disposable_storage_test \
  cargo test --locked --test postgres -- --ignored --nocapture
APP_STORAGE_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://.../disposable_storage_test \
  cargo run --locked --example encrypted_settings

Select an empty disposable database for the contract test. Its minimum fixture schema is not a production identity/RLS/schema installation. The example then uses a fresh ephemeral test-only AES-GCM key, actual model preparation, encrypted storage, internal resolution and secret-safe projection, rolling back everything. No key, plaintext or ciphertext is printed. Production hosts supply their actual identity, key and supported schema owners.

Independent PostgreSQL cases pass for actual AEAD wrong-key and shop/app/kind/revision substitution rejection, missing/current/stale configuration, CAS/package mismatch, unavailable key, overflow, two concurrent rotations, metadata-only projection, atomic outbox failure rollback and rotation blocked by a webhook shared read. All prior storage/job/install cases remain in the driver; its long base fixture is separated into its own module. Clippy and example pass.

Composed acceptance

The final assembled native binary passes nine targeted HTTP/PostgreSQL modules: apps, app_jobs, staging, tenant_isolation, app_secrets, app_surfaces, app_events, app_assistants and marketplaces. Strict non-owner forced-RLS service calls use actual encrypted tenant credentials; CAS/approved package/foreign actor rejection and metadata redaction pass. Incoming signed webhooks adopt their path tenant, reject conflicting/revoked signatures and stop for paused shops. The new exhausted-revision HTTP regression returns 400 without changing the working credential. Settings/custom service actions, private sandbox denial, event delivery, schedules, MCP opt-in/current scopes and Marketplace native order/stock flows remain connected.

All 74 native app unit tests, independent PostgreSQL contract/example and warning-free component/Core Clippy pass. Exact source/WIT pins, 32 Cargo boundary controls, six image-context closures, 870 Rust module structure and 351 static API routes pass. The Apps PR 17 Linux CI runs the unchanged model/runtime plus the expanded storage contract and example. Only affected Core tests ran; complete verification retains its daily cadence. Existing extracted-policy and mutation checks retain their scope; surrounding SQL/crypto/host code is tested and reviewed, not formally proved.

Remaining boundary

APP-02/MKT-03b remain open for version/identity orchestration, independent supported production schema and authenticated API/MCP hosting. The library does not admit HTTP principals, create pools/schemas, provision keys, supply runtime fallbacks or commit transactions. Existing extracted-policy proof scope is unchanged; shared SQL/crypto adapters remain reviewed and tested, unproved code. Library/local acceptance does not establish a new public Core runtime rollout.